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Abstract
What drives globalization today and in the past? We employ a new micro-founded
measure of bilateral trade costs based on a standard model of trade in diﬀerentiated goods
to address this question. These trade costs gauge the diﬀerence between observed bilateral
trade and frictionless trade. They comprise tariﬀs, transportation costs and all other factors
that impede international trade but which are inherently diﬃcult to observe. Trade costs
fell on average by ten to ￿fteen percent between 1870 and 1913. We also use this measure
to decompose the growth of global trade over that period and ￿nd that roughly 44 percent
of the global trade boom can be explained by reductions in trade costs; the remaining 56
percent is attributable to economic expansion.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
International trade costs are the costs of transaction and transport associated with the ex-
change of goods across national borders and, thus, impede international economic integration.
They may also drive many key ￿ndings in the contemporary open-economy macroeconomics
literature (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2000). At the same time, economists know little about the
magnitude, evolution, and determinants of these obstacles to international trade (Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2004).
Research on the nineteenth century trade boom has tracked certain costs like freight rates
and tariﬀs reasonably well (O￿Rourke and Williamson, 1999). But the magnitude and impact of
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1a host of other important impediments to trade that are inherently diﬃc u l tt om e a s u r el i k en o n -
tariﬀ barriers, information costs, distribution channels, market micro-structures, legal frictions,
and the costs of uncertainty remain unexplored. As a step towards a better understanding of
these costs, our strategy is to move beyond the study of individual commodities and particular
trade cost elements to a more general approach derived from sound economic theory.
We present a new comprehensive measure of international trade costs. We study trade costs
that are broadly de￿ned and encompass not only shipping costs and tariﬀs but also many other
informational, institutional, and non-tariﬀ barriers to trade. Our focus is on the ￿rst wave of
globalization from 1870 to 1913, a period that experienced many changes in trade costs and
substantial growth in trade.
Our measure is derived from a micro founded gravity model of trade that is fully consistent
with the state-of-the-art gravity equation literature (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).
The framework is a multiple-country general equilibrium model of trade in diﬀerentiated goods
based on Novy (2007). We include bilateral trade costs and emphasize that to be consistent with
the theory these must be measured against trade costs with all other trade partners. Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) call this multilateral resistance, and our measure captures this.
The innovation here is to model and control for multilateral resistance in a tractable, yet
previously un-noticed way. This makes it possible to back out the bilateral trade costs from
the model￿s gravity equation of international trade. It also obviates the estimation of arbitrary
speci￿cations of the trade cost function which is a typical feature of the current gravity litera-
ture. Instead, we compute trade costs directly on the basis of bilateral trade, total trade and
output data.
The average level of trade costs between the US, UK, France and their trading partners
fell by ten to ￿fteen percent in the forty years before World War I. Trade costs declined at a
rate of about 0.3 percent per year for the average country pair. The annual fall in trade costs
was therefore not as large as the roughly two percent annual decline in freight indices between
1870 and 1913 noted by Harley (1988) and Shah Mohammed and Williamson (2004). The
diﬀerence can easily be reconciled. Transportation costs are only one input into trade costs, as
2emphasized by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). The factors contributing to declines in trade
costs include ocean shipping freight rates, the rise of the classical gold standard and improved
communication technology. On the other hand, international trade costs did not fall as quickly
as they might have because of tariﬀs (measured as tariﬀ revenue relative to total imports) that
rose on average by 50 percent between 1870 and 1913, new non-tariﬀ barriers, and ostensibly
faster domestic integration.1
This allows for an interpretation of the late nineteenth century in which overall declines in
aggregate trade costs were much smaller than the observed decline in maritime freight rates.
Nevertheless, this is still compatible with a ￿￿rst wave of globalization￿ since small changes in
trade costs can be suﬃcient to generate large increases in trade ￿o w sa sa r g u e db yO b s t f e l d
and Rogoﬀ (2000). And in fact, there is no question that these changes are most likely the
principal drivers of the rise in the share of output devoted to international trade. We argue
and demonstrate that one does not need to appeal to large changes in trade costs to see the
doubling in the export to GDP ratio reported by O￿Rourke and Findlay (2003).
After examining the levels and trends in trade costs, we turn to the determinants of trade
costs. This exercise underscores that our trade cost measure is reliable. In particular, our
evidence suggests that standard variables like geographic proximity, trade policy, transportation
costs, adherence to the gold standard, and membership in the British Empire matter in sensible
ways for explaining trade costs.
Turning to the question of what drives globalization episodes, we use the micro-founded
gravity equation to attribute the growth in global trade to two fundamental driving forces ￿ the
growth in productive capacity and the decline in trade costs. In line with the post-World War II
experience (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2001 and Whalley and Xin, 2007), we ￿nd that roughly
56 percent of the global trade boom prior to World War I was due to the growth in productive
capacity and 44 percent was due to the decline in trade costs. We unmask a substantial degree
1See Williamson (2006) on the global rise in tariﬀsm e a s u r e da st a r i ﬀ revenue divided by import values. His
world average rises from 12 percent in 1865 to 17.5 percent in 1900. See Saul (1967) for a discussion of non-tariﬀ
barriers. See Jacks (2005) on domestic integration based on wheat price data. He shows much faster within-
country integration than cross-border integration. A fall in the cost of domestic trade (all else equal) makes
international trade relatively more costly.
3of heterogeneity between core and periphery performance. Economic expansion contributes
the lion￿s share of trade growth for core countries while trade cost declines dominate for the
periphery.
2 Historical Perspectives on Trade Costs
Economic historians generally concede that the ￿fty years before World War I comprise a period
of globalization akin to our own in many respects. The world economy witnessed sustained
increases in international commodity, capital, and labor ￿ows (O￿Rourke and Williamson, 1999
and Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). Historical accounts, as well as popular conceptions of trade in
the years from 1870 to 1913, have generally stressed the singular role played by developments in
transportation and communication technologies in conquering time and space. The extension
of the railroad and telegraph networks take pride of place in promoting economic integration
domestically and in helping move goods to ports. In this view the increased use of steam
ships and persistent improvements in shipping technology play a similar role with respect to
international markets (see Frieden, 2006, p. 19 and James, 2001, pp. 10-13).
In the most in￿uential contribution to this literature, O￿Rourke and Williamson accordingly
write that the ￿impressive increase in commodity market integration in the Atlantic economy
[of] the late nineteenth century￿ was a consequence of ￿sharply declining transport costs￿ (1999,
p. 33). Their metric for integration is the narrowing of price gaps for key commodities such
as wheat and iron. The data on this commodity price convergence throughout the nineteenth
century is extensive and well-documented (O￿Rourke and Williamson, 1994 and Jacks, 2005).
However, O￿Rourke and Williamson (1999) are quick to point out that a host of other factors
could also be responsible for the dramatic boom in global trade during the period, chief among
them being increases in GDP and import demand.
What about other costs of trade besides transport? Recent research suggests a strong role
for developments outside the communication and transportation sectors. Jacks (2006) oﬀers
evidence from a number of North Atlantic grain markets between 1800 and 1913 that freight
costs can only explain a relatively modest fraction of trade costs in those markets. Jacks
4concludes that trade costs were also powerfully in￿uenced by the choice of monetary regime
and commercial policy as well as the diplomatic environment in which trade took place. Even
so, a substantial portion of trade costs are left unexplained by these observables.
Ad i ﬀerent strand in the literature has examined integration based on the gravity approach
to international trade. Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor (2003), Flandreau and Maurel (2001),
and L￿pez-C￿rdova and Meissner (2003) ￿nd that distance, tariﬀs, monetary regime coordina-
tion as well as cultural and political factors played a very important role in explaining global
trade patterns.
And what of the view from the nineteenth century itself? The perceived factors were
manifold but could be boiled down to technological, informational, and institutional ones.
Such views are summarized in an 1897 study of trade costs in the British colonies conducted
and published at the request of Joseph Chamberlain (Trade of the British Empire and Foreign
Competition, 1897). The report surveyed colonial governors as to the reasons why non-Empire
producers were gaining market share in the British Empire.
From their comments, it is obvious that determining total trade costs is more complex than
adding together an ad valorem tariﬀ value and unit shipping costs. Shipping costs were diﬃcult
to calculate directly as they varied by good, season, and with local economic conditions. The
governor of the colony of Victoria in Australia hesitated to give an average of the freight costs
from Europe due to such ￿uctuations. The diﬀu s i o no ft h es t e a m s h i pw a sn os i m p l em a t t e r
either as it favored certain classes of goods while sailing ships, still in heavy use on many longer
routes as late as 1894, favored others. There were also government subsidies on several, but
not all, key liners traveling between East Asia and Europe. All of this suggests that any single
freight index based on only a few commodities and routes is bound to be problematic if used
as a summary measure of shipping costs.
Other governors also noted how diﬀerential marketing techniques, proximity, information
about local tastes and needs, credit practices, the relative quality and appearance of goods,
exchange rate stability, and even the precise weights and measures used in the marketing process
helped determine trade ￿ows. Moreover, Saul (1967) discusses at length how non-tariﬀ barriers
5were impeding trade. Discriminatory railway tariﬀs, health and safety regulations, along with
conditional clauses to trade treaties and lengthy legal delays in challenging them featured in
the late nineteenth century trading system.
What all of this evidence suggests is that our knowledge of the drivers and level of interna-
tional integration in the nineteenth century has a gap. Moving beyond the study of individual
commodities and particular trade cost elements to a more general attack on the issue may be
bene￿cial in this regard. We now show how to measure trade costs this way.
3 International Trade in General Equilibrium with Trade Costs
Recent theoretical advances in the trade literature have revived interest in trade costs as a de-
terminant of bilateral trade. In their state-of-the-art contribution, Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) provide a now widely used method to estimate the elasticity of trade with respect to
speci￿c bilateral trade barriers. Moreover, they show how to avoid an omitted variables bias
in such an estimation. They demonstrate that the volume of trade between two countries is
not only determined by their bilateral trade barrier but also by their trade barriers with all
other trading partners. These ￿multilateral￿ barriers are appropriately weighted averages of all
bilateral barriers. Intuitively, what matters for the volume of trade between two particular
countries is how their bilateral barrier compares to other bilateral barriers.
Novy (2007) shows that multilateral trade barriers can simply be related to a country￿s total
exports. The intuition is that the more a country exports, the lower must be its trade barriers
with other countries. Given this way of controlling for time-varying multilateral resistance,
the model goes on to derive an analytical solution for micro-founded bilateral trade costs that
depends on observable variables such as trade and output data. It therefore becomes possible
to compute bilateral trade costs over time. This is the strategy that we pursue in this paper.
It is important to stress that the model by Novy (2007) is based on the same multiple-
country general equilibrium framework as the model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In
particular, goods are diﬀerentiated by country and consumers love variety, so we use a standard
CES Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index. Trade between countries is costly, as captured by iceberg
6trade costs.
The innovation of the theoretical model is twofold. First, as already mentioned, the model
provides a convenient way of controlling for multilateral resistance so that it becomes possible
to solve for bilateral trade costs. This simpli￿cation implies that we do not need to impose any
particular structure on trade costs either as to the set of determinants or their underlying func-
tional form.2 Second, the model relaxes the assumption made by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), and nearly all of the gravity literature, that all goods are tradable. When computing
t r a d ec o s t s ,w ee x p l i c i t l ya l l o wf o rt h ef a c tt h a ts o m eg o o d sa r en o n t r a d a b l e . B e l o ww et e s t
the sensitivity of all of our results to this modi￿cation and show that our central ￿ndings are
robust.
Since many trade cost components are not directly observable, the need for a micro-founded
trade model to infer total trade costs is evident. Our trade cost measure is comprehensive
because it captures a wide range of trade frictions. We do not restrict our interpretation of
trade costs to well-known trade barriers such as tariﬀs and transportation costs. Following
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) and Eaton and Kortum (2002), we acknowledge that
many sizeable trade cost components such as language barriers, communication costs and non-
tariﬀ barriers are not directly observable or measurable in price diﬀerentials alone.
Finally, it should be emphasized that we consider aggregate trade and thus a very large
range of goods. The price gap methodology is simplicity itself but is restricted to only a few
goods due to data limitations and rests on an implicit arbitrage equation and the absence of
price discrimination (see Section 4 in Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). We base our results
on a proven trade model ￿ the gravity model. As in any other gravity model, we have to impose
assumptions on the elasticity of substitution and the aggregate tradability of the economy to
generate an estimate of bilateral trade costs. But as we show in the appendix, neither of these
two assumptions are too strong for our empirical conclusions. Overall, we view our methodology
as complementary to measures of price gaps. We therefore think that both approaches have
2The gravity equations by Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) include
unobservable and highly nonlinear price indices. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) only consider transportation costs
and tariﬀs, whereas Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) assume that trade costs are a function of distance and a
border barrier.
7advantages and shortcomings and, while focusing on diﬀerent aspects, each can provide valuable
insights into the integration of world markets.
3.1 A Gravity Equation with Trade Costs
This section provides a brief outline of the Novy (2007) model. The details of the model are given
in the technical appendix for reference. The model is general equilibrium and comprises multiple
countries that can vary in size. In each country, monopolistically competitive ￿rms produce
diﬀerentiated goods. Optimizing individuals receive utility from consuming a large variety
of both domestic and foreign goods. When goods are shipped from country j to country k,
exogenous iceberg trade costs τj,k are incurred, meaning that for each unit the fraction τj,k melts
away during the trading process as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean. Modeling trade
costs in this way is well established and customary in the literature; for example see Samuelson
(1954), Krugman (1980) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) whose representation of trade
costs is equivalent to using iceberg trade costs.
We emphasize that trade costs τj,k actually capture what makes international trade more
costly over and above intranational trade. For more details on this point see Novy (2007)
and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p. 716).3 We also follow the literature by making the
standard assumption of trade cost symmetry (τj,k = τk,j), and without loss of generality we
normalize intranational trade costs to zero (see for example Baier and Bergstrand, 2001).4
The equilibrium solution of the model gives rise to the following micro-founded gravity
equation
(1) EXPj,kEXPk,j = sj(GDPj − EXPj)sk(GDPk − EXPk)(1 − τj,k)2ρ−2
where GDPj is real output of country j, EXPj,k are real exports from j to k and EXPj ≡
P
k6=j EXPj,k are total real exports from j. The elasticity of substitution is given by ρ and sj
3This point can be seen in the example of grain shipments from the US to the UK after 1850. Much of
the decrease in the price gap between England and the US came through a narrowing of price gaps between
the Midwest and the East coast. Better and cheaper transportation networks improved the links between the
Midwest and the Atlantic ports. In this case we might see commodity price convergence between Chicago and
Liverpool but little change in trade shares. Federico and Persson (2007) examine this issue in detail.
4Even if the two bilateral trade barriers are asymmetric, their geometric average corresponds precisely to the
trade costs implied by the symmetry assumption. Our trade costs can therefore be interpreted as an average of
the barriers in both directions. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p. 175) for details.
8is the fraction of the entire range of goods produced in country j that are tradable.
Empirically we distinguish between traded and tradable. Goods may be tradable but traded
in only very small quantities or not at all due to prohibitive trade costs. For instance, beef
from Argentina could have been exported to Europe at great cost prior to modern refrigeration
technology, so we would classify this product as tradable throughout the period but not very
heavily traded. Some portion of the range of goods produced, however, is inherently nontradable
such as government defense services and so forth.
Our gravity equation is not a function of a simple GDP term. As in any gravity equation,
bilateral trade ￿ows are an increasing function of productive capacity and a decreasing function
of trade frictions. The innovation of micro-founded gravity equation (1) is to show that the
total export terms encompass multilateral trade barriers in a convenient and practical way. In
particular, the size variables GDP −EXP are theoretically appropriate controls for multilateral
resistance (see the technical appendix for a formal derivation). For example, suppose that
exports of country j with all other countries besides k increase so that EXPj increases. Hold
all else equal on the right hand side of equation (1). Then EXPj,kEXPk,j must go down. The
intuition is as follows. For total exports EXPj to increase, country j￿s trade costs with other
countries must have decreased, for instance τj,l with l 6= k. Trade with country k has therefore
become relatively more costly, leading to the decrease in EXPj,kEXPk,j. Equation (1) thus
captures the point forcefully made by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) that trade ￿ows are
not only determined by bilateral trade costs τj,k but also by multilateral trade barriers.
3.2 A Micro-Founded Measure of Trade Costs
Since equation (1) relates multilateral resistance to total export terms, it becomes possible to
rearrange equation (1) so as to directly solve for trade costs τj,k as a function of observable








This is our key equation. Trade costs are not estimated. They are simply calculated directly
as a function of the trade and GDP data. Equation (2) shows intuitively that if trade ￿ows
9between j and k have increased but productive capacity in the two countries has remained
constant, then trade costs must have come down to facilitate the increase in trade. Conversely,
if trade ￿ows between j and k have remained constant but productive capacity has increased,
then trade costs must have gone up because the increase in output has not fed through to trade.
Note that productivity changes do not aﬀect τj,k. Consistent with the overwhelming major-
ity of models in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature, the production function is
linear in productivity (see the technical appendix and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1995). An increase
in the productivity of country j will therefore feature multiplicatively in bilateral exports, in
total exports, and in GDP and will therefore cancel out in equation (2). The intuition is that
price changes arising from productivity changes aﬀect all consumers both domestic and foreign.
Trade costs measure the relative cost of international versus domestic trade.
We consider aggregate trade ￿ows between j and k such that τj,k is a measure of aggregate
trade costs. Trade in particular goods like wheat or coal is not our focus. Also, our trade costs
are country-pair speci￿c and it is easy to compute the change of these trade costs over time.
As shown in the technical appendix, trade cost measure (2) is also valid in the more general
case when countries run trade de￿cits or surpluses.
4 Empirical Trade Costs
4.1 Data and Methods
In this section, we provide an overview of trends in trade costs from 1870 to 1913. To compute
trade costs, we make use of the expression given in (2). All that is needed is bilateral trade data,
and data on total exports and GDP. We have such annual data for 18 countries.5 This sample
accounts for over 60 percent of world GDP and trade in 1913. The GDP data was taken from
Maddison (1995) while the trade data was taken from the Tableau GØnØral du Commerce de la
France avec ses Colonies et les Puissances EtrangŁres (various years), the Statistical Abstract of
the United Kingdom (various years) and the Statistical Abstract of the United States (various
5Our sample includes: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Dutch East Indies, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
10years). We consider all French, UK, and US destined or originated bilateral trade for which
there is also a full set of GDP data (15 countries plus France, the UK, and the US). Thus, the
full panel of trade costs is balanced and evenly weighted between French, UK, and US trade
with 2,112 unique dyadic observations in total. In the regressions below, ￿fteen observations
are lost for countries with no railways (Japan before 1872 and New Zealand before 1873), but
this is not expected to impart any systematic bias.
Two parameter assumptions are necessary to compute trade costs. We direct the reader
to Appendix B which demonstrates that the overall qualitative results are not too sensitive to
these assumptions. For the reported results, the fraction of tradable goods produced, s,w a s
set to 0.8 while the elasticity of substitution, ρ ,w a ss e tt oe l e v e n . 6
4.2 Results
The resulting trade cost series can be seen in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 presents the simple
average of trade cost levels for the three countries. Figure 4 presents the indexed value of these
trade costs over time (1870 = 100). A few important elements are clearly documented. First, as
seen in Figure 3, France and the United Kingdom enjoyed substantially lower trade costs than
the United States for the entire period, perhaps re￿ecting not only the maturity of their trading
relationships but also their greater proximity to many of the world￿s leading markets. Second,
the initial level of trade costs seems to condition their subsequent evolution: the United States
experienced a much more dramatic decline in trade costs over time, 16 percent (7.7 percentage
points) versus France￿s 13 percent decline and the UK￿s 10 percent (5.5 and 3.7 percentage
points, respectively). Finally from Figure 4, it seems that most of the decline in trade costs,
especially for France and the United Kingdom, was concentrated between 1870 and 1880. This
was, of course, a time of simultaneously declining freight rates and tariﬀsa sw e l la si n c r e a s i n g
6When the elasticity of substitution is set equal to eleven, this corresponds to a ten percent markup over
marginal cost. Irwin (2003) shows rough evidence of a 9.8 percent markup in American steel and pig iron
products in the late nineteenth century. Typical estimates in the contemporary literature, based on recent data
comprising goods that are more diﬀerentiated and therefore less substitutable, are around seven or eight as noted
in Anderson and van Wincooop (2004). Evenett and Keller (2002) suggest that the share of output in recent
years that is tradable is in the range of 0.3 to 0.8. Stockman and Tesar (1995) argue that the share of tradable
output would be in the range of 0.65 and 0.82. Moreover, it is decreasing in the size of the service and public
sector which are typically nontradable. Both sectors were much less signi￿cant in terms of total output in our
period.
11adherence to the gold standard.
5 The Determinants of Trade Costs
Researchers have focused on transportation, communication costs, tariﬀs, national borders, and
currency unions as determinants of trade costs. Little consensus exists on the functional form
that best describes trade costs. As our baseline, and following the bulk of previous work so as
to provide comparable results, we consider a log-linear speci￿cation of iceberg trade costs of
the following form:
(3) τjkt = Distδ
jkeβ0+β1Xjkt+ηjkt
where β1is a vector of coeﬃcients, Distjk is the great-circle distance between two countries￿
capitals, δ is the elasticity of iceberg trade costs with respect to distance, and ηjkt is a composite
error term. This implies the following estimating equation:
(4) ln(τjkt)=β0 + δln(Distjk)+β1Xjkt + dt + υjk + εjkt
where we allow for the composite error term to consist of a country-pair speci￿cc o m p o n e n tυjk
(i.e., a ￿xed eﬀect or a random eﬀect) and a country-pair white noise error term εjkt.I n a l l
speci￿cations, we include time ￿xed eﬀects collected in the vector of year indicators dt. Apart
from the previously mentioned distance variable, we consider a parsimonious set of potential
trade cost determinants Xjkt: tariﬀs( d e ￿ned as the log product of each partner￿s ratio of tariﬀ
revenue to imports), bilateral exchange rate volatility (measured as the standard deviation of the
change in the logged nominal monthly exchange rate), gold standard adherence, membership
in the British Empire, and the penetration of railroads (de￿ned as the log product of each
partner￿s ratio of railroad mileage to land area). Table 1 provides the summary statistics of
our data, see the data appendix for the data sources. In Table 2 we report two separate
regression speci￿cations of equation (4). The ￿rst column presents our preferred results from a
random eﬀects speci￿cation. The second column presents the results from a country-pair ￿xed
12eﬀects speci￿cation. Country-pair ￿xed eﬀects control for unobservables or omitted factors
at the country-pair level and therefore cannot separately estimate the impact of distance and
membership in the British Empire. It can readily be seen that the inferences drawn from column
1 are highly robust to time-invariant heterogeneity at the country-pair level. We discuss the
results from column 1.
Nations further apart ￿ reassuringly ￿ had higher trade costs. Taking 0.07 as the distance
elasticity from column 1, the standardized coeﬃcient for distance is measured as 0.40. That is,
a one standard deviation increase in the distance between countries would be associated with
nearly a one half standard deviation increase in trade costs.
The sign of the log product of tariﬀs is consistent with reasonable priors, although we should
note that we lack country-pair speci￿c information on tariﬀ barriers ￿ that is, these measures
capture the general level of protection aﬀorded in French and US markets, for example, but not
the protection aﬀorded against French goods in US markets and vice versa. The point estimate
suggests that a one percent rise in the log product of tariﬀsi sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hat w op e r c e n t
rise in trade costs.
Adherence to the gold standard also appears to be associated with lower trade costs. Adop-
tion of the gold standard is predicted to bring about a roughly 3.6 percent decline in trade costs.
As previous work has shown, credible exchange rate stability seems to go along with greater
trade. Interestingly, exchange rate volatility itself does not seem to have any association with
trade costs. A potential explanation lies in the fact that exchange rate volatility and the gold
standard are strongly correlated: adherence to the gold standard entails virtually zero exchange
rate volatility. This view is con￿rmed by regressions containing only exchange rate volatility;
in this case, it is positively signed and signi￿cant.
When both countries are in the British Empire this is associated with 50 percent lower trade
costs. This high number does not, however, suggest absurdly low trade costs between the UK
and its colonies. It must be kept in mind that the British Empire was a far-￿ung aﬀair, with
distances from London in our sample ranging from a ￿mere￿ 5,376 kilometers for Canada to over
18,000 for Australia and New Zealand. Despite this moderating eﬀect of distance, the privileges
13of imperial membership are hard to deny, a result which is consistent with the emerging view
on empire and trade (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2007).
The period we are considering is widely regarded to be one of improved infrastructure and
declining shipping costs. In our regressions we ￿nd some support for the view that domestic
transportation infrastructure matters for international trade costs. The standardized ￿beta￿
coeﬃcient on railroad density is -0.14. In other words, a one standard deviation increase in
the total length of a dyad￿s railway network (relative to land area) would have decreased trade
costs by about one-seventh of a standard deviation.
To understand how each of the trade cost proxies used above aﬀects actual trade levels, one
would need further information on the elasticity of substitution. For instance, we ￿nd that the
gold standard may have decreased trade costs by 3.6 percent. This ￿nding is compatible with
the seemingly larger eﬀect of the gold standard on bilateral trade (roughly 30 percent or more
in the literature) because what matters is the interaction between the elasticity of substitution
and the estimated impact of the gold standard on trade costs (see equation (1)).
Overall we ￿nd that our trade cost measure relates sensibly to standard proxies for trade
costs. Naturally this should be the case since what we have undertaken is only one small, but
non-obvious, step beyond what standard gravity models of trade do when they use a vector
of trade cost proxies in regressions explaining bilateral trade. Our regressions show that an
overall decline of trade costs of 10 to 15 percent over the entire period can be reconciled with
the following interpretation: trade costs are a function of many variables and over time some
rose, some declined and others stayed roughly constant; rising tariﬀs partially oﬀset declining
freight rates; ￿nally, other trade cost components related to factors that are more diﬃcult to
measure fell slightly but not massively. Being more precise about the particular factors that
mattered at the bilateral level merits further study.
6 Accounting for the Increases in Global Trade 1870-1913
Finally, we return to our key question: what accounts for the marked increase in global trade
￿ows between 1870 and 1913? The existing literature on the pre-World War I and post-World
14War II waves of globalization oﬀers likely suspects. On the one hand, much of the historical
literature has emphasized reductions in trade costs, speci￿cally those arising from endogenous
changes in commercial policy and exogenous changes in transport technology (O￿Rourke and
Williamson, 1999). On the other hand, much of the contemporary literature has emphasized
secular patterns in income growth and convergence (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001). What we aim
for in this section is to relate changes in bilateral trade ￿ows to changes in productive capacity
and changes in trade costs in an accounting sense. Our micro-founded gravity model provides
a straightforward way of doing this. To arrive at a ￿decomposition￿ of the factors aﬀecting the
growth of trade we perform the following exercise. Assuming that sj and sk are constant, we
take the natural logarithm and then the ￿rst diﬀerence of gravity equation (1) to obtain
(5)
∆ln(EXPj,ktEXPk,jt)=∆ln((GDPjt − EXPjt)(GDPkt − EXPkt))+(2ρ − 2)∆ln(1 − τj,kt).
Then divide everything by ∆ln(EXPj,ktEXPk,jt) to get
(6)
1 = 100% =
∆ln((GDPjt − EXPjt)(GDPkt − EXPkt))
∆ln(EXPj,ktEXPk,jt)




The ￿rst term on the right-hand side accounts for increases in bilateral trade due to economic
growth. The second term accounts for increases in trade due to a decline in bilateral trade costs.
It is readily seen from (6) that the contribution of the decline in trade costs is invariant to the
value of the elasticity of substitution because the share going to the GDP terms is given by the
data. This is true even if the elasticity changes over time.
In deriving (6) we have implicitly assumed that the parameters sj and sk,w h i c hi n d i c a t e
the fraction of all goods that are tradable, remain constant over time. For the post-World
War II period this proves to be a realistic assumption as the increase in the range of tradable
goods has been oﬀset by the increase in nontradable services (Novy, 2007). If the output of
tradable goods in fact increased faster than the output of nontradable goods, this would make
the decline in trade costs less important in explaining the growth of trade but it would not
aﬀect the contribution of economic expansion. In that sense, the numbers that we report in
15this section can be seen as an upper bound for the contribution of the decline in trade costs.
In Table 3 we report the growth in trade for our balanced sample between 1870 and 1913 and
the respective contributions of economic expansion and the decline in trade costs in explaining
this trade boom. We carry out this exercise for various subsamples of our data set. The ￿rst
row presents results for the full sample. Here we see that about 56 percent of the expansion
of trade can be accounted for by changes in trading partners￿ productive capacity, whereas
declines in trade costs account for about 44 percent of the growth in trade. These results
suggest a slightly larger role for trade costs than the ￿ndings of Baier and Bergstrand (2001)
who argued that two-thirds of the growth in trade amongst OECD countries between 1958 and
1988 was explained by the growth of output. But our framework also allows such calculations
for speci￿c country pairs.
For trade between the more economically advanced and proximate countries in Europe,
economic expansion contributes the lion share to the expansion of trade. The decline in trade
costs is much more important for the markets outside of Europe and America. Declines in trade
costs with partners in Asia and Oceania are responsible for 65 and 56 percent of the increase
in trade, respectively.
This geographical diﬀerence is consistent with the idea that in core-periphery trade between
1870 and 1913 real freight rates fell more quickly. There was also an expansion of trading
networks through pro-active marketing strategies in new markets, new shipping lines were
established, and telegraph connections in the less industrialized world improved. These factors
together expanded trade with the less developed world despite the rapidly rising tariﬀso fm a n y
trading partners documented in Williamson (2006). The results from the core are also consistent
with the fact that the majority of their communications infrastructure was in place well before
1880 and that the tariﬀ backlash in Europe increased trade costs.
The decline in trade costs has the most explanatory power for the growth in US trade and
the least explanatory power for the growth in British trade (see Table 3). One reason for this
heterogeneity is that prior to our sample period the UK had already become well integrated into
the world economy and generally had managed to lower trade costs far below those of the US
16and France (see Figure 3). This was due to its early free trade stance, its colonial connections
and the proximity of economic activity to the sea.
Thus, to some extent the US and France caught up with the UK in reaping the bene￿ts
from lower trade costs as they penetrated markets that were once the domain of Britain. In
explaining this phenomenon, the economic history literature (see the industry speci￿ce s s a y si n
Aldcroft, 1968) has focused on productivity versus trade barriers broadly de￿ned. Our results
appear consistent with the idea that the US and France increased their international market
shares more by lowering trade costs than by scoring productivity gains.
Given that falling trade costs can only explain about 44 percent of the pre-World War I
trade boom, an overriding role for communication and transportation technologies in the ￿rst
wave of globalization is muted. This is for two reasons. Increases in tariﬀs put downward
pressure on the fraction of the growth in trade attributable to falling trade costs. But secular
increases in income were also key in fuelling the growth of trade. Overall, we are suggesting a
view in which the primary mover of increased trade volumes is the secular increase in income
with ancillary contributions from policy and technology. Assumptions about the parameters do
not aﬀect this conclusion. Nevertheless, overall declines in trade costs are almost by de￿nition
the largest contributor to the increases in the ratio of trade to output over the period as per
the consensus in the literature. Our contribution is to ￿nd a way of measuring how large these
changes could have been.
We should emphasize again that we obtain these decomposition results by using a standard
framework of trade in diﬀerentiated goods with trade costs that is widely used and accepted in
the literature (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 and 2004). In particular, a unit income
elasticity is standard in the theoretical gravity literature. Evenett and Keller (2002) derive
gravity models from several leading theories of international trade, all of which are characterized
by unit income elasticities.7 T h u s ,e v e ni fw ea l l o wf o rd i ﬀerences in the underlying modeling
7Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) allow for non-unit income elasticities by assuming that the share φ of
income spent on tradables equals Y
α, despite the fact that they themselves argue ￿there is no clear theoretical
foundation for specifying the fraction spent on tradables as Y
α.￿ More alarmingly for proponents of the idea that
trade costs are the key driver of integration, Anderson and van Wincoop note that α is likely to be greater than
zero, implying an income elasticity greater than one. To the extent that their argument is valid, an imposed unit
income elasticity provides an upper bound for the impact of trade costs.
17strategy, or the value of parameters underlying our trade cost calculations, the fact remains
that changes in income will always explain a majority of the growth in bilateral trade for this
period. As in all of the standard gravity literature, an implicit assumption in our paper is of
course that aggregate trade costs are exogenous to economic expansion and the growth of trade.
In our view, the theoretical exploration of endogenous trade costs is a fruitful avenue for future
research.
7 Conclusions
We have studied the evolution and determinants of trade costs between 1870 and 1913. The
theoretical foundation for these trade costs represents a new way of explaining international
trade integration that is much easier to implement empirically than existing general equilibrium
gravity models of international trade. We now relate ￿multilateral￿ resistance terms to observ-
able variables. This provides a convenient way to compute, not estimate, implied bilateral
international trade costs.
The patterns we have found suggest that overall trade costs did not decline dramatically
after 1870 since tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers rose. In the face of a shipping cost plunge, and
the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty for many trading partners, trade costs seem to
have fallen by roughly ten to twenty percent. Slightly over 50 percent of the variation in
these trade costs appears to be explained by proximity, policies, infrastructure, and the British
Empire. Our measure can easily be extended to provide a quantitative grasp of qualitative
observations made by country specialists and historians. They can also obviously be used in
empirical research in international economics where a measure of trade costs is needed.
Finally, economic expansion and the decline in trade costs appear to be almost equally
responsible for increasing international trade between 1870 and 1913. The trade boom of the
nineteenth century therefore does not seem to be all about policy nor all about shipping and
communications. Economic growth and productivity advances were also important drivers of
the ￿rst wave of globalization.
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Technical Appendix
This appendix reproduces the model developed by Novy (2007). It outlines how to derive
gravity equation (1). Moreover, it demonstrates that trade cost expression (2) holds even when
countries run trade de￿cits or surpluses.
A.1 Optimizing Consumers
Optimizing consumers and ￿rms inhabit J countries with j =1 ,2,...,J and J ≥ 2. The range
of all consumers and of all goods produced in the world is the continuum [0,1].C o u n t r y j
comprises the consumer range [nj−1,n j] and country-j monopolistic ￿rms each produce one
diﬀerentiated good on the same range, where n0 =0and nJ =1 . It is assumed that the
exogenous fraction sj of goods is tradable so that [nj−1,n j−1+sj(nj −nj−1)] is the range of all
tradable goods produced by country j (0 <s j ≤ 1). These can be purchased by all consumers
in the world. The remaining range [nj−1+sj(nj −nj−1),n j] represents country j￿s nontradable
goods. The latter are available for purchase to country-j consumers only.
Exogenous bilateral iceberg trade costs τj,k are incurred when goods are shipped from
country j to country k where
τj,k
‰
≥ 0 for j 6= k
=0 for j = k
with τj,k < 1. It is assumed that bilateral trade costs are symmetric (τj,k = τk,j). The
assumption of zero intranational trade costs is a normalization which can also be found in
Baier and Bergstrand (2001).
All consumers within one country are identical. They like consumption and dislike work
such that their utility can be described as
(7) Uj =l nCj + ηln(1 − Lj)
where Cj and Lj denote per-capita consumption and labor input in country j. The parameter


















where cji denotes the per-capita consumption of good i in country j.T h ec o u n t r y - j consumption
index (8) is de￿ned over all tradable goods produced in the world, which is the left term within
the brackets of (8), plus all nontradable goods produced by country j,w h i c ha r eg i v e nb yt h e
right term within the brackets. The parameter ρ>1 is the elasticity of substitution and it is
assumed to be identical across countries.
The consumption-based price index, de￿ned as the minimum expenditure for one unit of


















ki for nk−1 ≤ i ≤ nk−1 + sk(nk − nk−1) ∀ j,k
pNT
ji for nj−1 + sj(nj − nj−1) ≤ i ≤ nj
19pT
ki denotes the f.o.b. (free on board) price of the tradable good produced by country-k ￿rm
i and pT
ki/(1 − τk,j) is the c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) price of the same good when traded
with country j. pNT
ji is the price of the nontradable good produced by country-j ￿rm i.A l l
prices are denominated in one world currency.
The c.i.f. price is 1/(1 − τk,j) times the f.o.b. price because when one unit of a tradable
good produced by a country-k ￿rm is shipped to country j,o n l yt h ef r a c t i o n(1 − τk,j) arrives















The per-capita budget constraint in country j is given by
(13) PjCj = WjLj + πj
where Wj is the nominal wage and πj denotes per-capita nominal pro￿ts made by country-j
￿rms, which are fully redistributed to country-j consumers.
A.2 Optimizing Firms
There is monopolistic competition such that each ￿rm is the single producer of one diﬀerentiated
good and sets the pro￿t-maximizing price. Not all ￿rms within one country are symmetric
since in country j the fraction sj of ￿rms produces tradable goods, whereas the fraction (1−sj)
produces nontradable goods. Let yT
ji denote the output produced by country-j tradable ￿rm
i and yNT
ji the output produced by country-j nontradable ￿rm i. In addition, let yT
ji,k be the







All ￿rms face a linear production function that has constant returns to scale and that







where Aj is an exogenous and country-speci￿c technology level that is assumed to be the same
across the tradable and nontradable sectors. LT
ji,k and LNT










Note that since all consumers within one country are identical, they each spread their labor over
all domestic ￿rms according to how much labor input each ￿rm needs. Since labor is assumed to
20be internationally immobile, domestic consumers do not work for foreign ￿rms. As in Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (1995), production does not exhibit increasing returns to scale. Since the number
of ￿rms in country j is given by the range [nj−1,n j], their pro￿ts are determined endogenously.
This framework is therefore consistent with the approach taken by, for instance, Anderson
(1979) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who assume that each region is specialized in
t h ep r o d u c t i o no fo n l yo n eg o o d .
Using demand function (12) market clearing for the tradable good produced by country-j
￿rm i requires








The right-hand side of (18) represents the amount of the tradable good i that the (nk − nk−1)
consumers in country k demand. The left-hand side is the amount of the same good that
arrives in country k after being shipped there from country j. Accordingly, market clearing for




















where Wj is the nominal wage that is the same across tradable and nontradable ￿rms because
workers are assumed to be mobile within countries. Plugging the production function (15)




















Thus, all country-j ￿r m ss e tt h es a m ep r i c epj, irrespective of whether they produce tradable
or nontradable goods.
A.3 Equilibrium of the Model
Since within one country all ￿rms producing tradable goods are symmetric and all ￿rms pro-
ducing nontradable goods are also symmetric, the index i will be dropped in the following.
Each country-j consumer maximizes utility (7) subject to budget constraint (13), leading to







21In order to solve the model it is useful to de￿ne per-capita output, per-capita labor supply and
per-capita pro￿ts as
yj ≡ sjyT
j +( 1− sj)yNT
j (25)
Lj ≡ sjLT
j +( 1− sj)LNT
j (26)
πj ≡ sjπT
j +( 1− sj)πNT
j
where yT
j is the same as yT
ji in (14), LT
j is the same LT
ji as in (17) and πT
j is the same as πT
ji in
(20). The remaining right-hand side variables are the corresponding variables for nontradable
￿rm i. Using the production functions (15) and (16) as well as the price markups (21)-(23) it
follows
πj = pjyj − WjLj
Combined with budget constraint (13) and the optimal labor supply condition (24) this yields




Express nominal wages across countries as
α1W1 = α2W2 = ... = αjWj = ... = αJWJ
where the α￿s are auxiliary parameters yet unknown. It follows from the price markups (21)-(23)
that































+( 1− sj)(nj − nj−1)A
ρ−1
j











Using budget constraint (13) and the optimal labor supply condition (24), expressions for





















22To solve for the α￿s in (29), start oﬀ with (25) and plug in the market-clearing conditions































At the same time, from the production functions (15) and (16), de￿nitions (25) and (26) and








I tm u s tt h e r e f o r eb et h ec a s et h a tt h ec u r l yb r a c k e t si n( 3 4 )a r ee q u a lt oωj as de￿n e di n( 2 9 ) .







































+(1− sj)(nj − nj−1)A
ρ−1
j
The system of polynomial equations represented by (36) for j =1 ,2,...,J cannot be solved
analytically. However, it can be established numerically by repeated substitution that a unique
solution exists for the ω￿s for all combinations of admissible parameter values. The admissible
parameter values are 0 <n k −nk−1 < 1, 0 <s k ≤ 1, ρ>1, Ak > 0 and 0 ≤ τk,j < 1 for all j,k.
The implicit function theorem can be applied to compute the partial eﬀects of changes in these
exogenous parameters on the ω￿s. The ω￿s give rise to sensible general equilibrium eﬀects for the
real wage, consumption and real pro￿ts in (30)-(32). For example, a technology improvement in
Aj increases ωj and therefore the real wage, consumption and real pro￿ts for country-j citizens
but, to a smaller extent, it also increases the other ω￿ sa n di st h u sa l s ob e n e ￿cial to foreign
citizens.
A.4 A Gravity Equation with Trade Costs
Given the equilibrium solution to the model, one can now derive the equilibrium trade ￿ows
between countries j and k. Since all country-j ￿rms producing tradable goods are symmetric
and since sj(nj − nj−1) is the overall number of these ￿rms, all goods that leave country j for
destination country k are given by
(37) EXPj,k = sj(nj − nj−1)yT
j,k
where EXPj,k denotes real exports from j to k. Likewise, all goods that leave country k for
export to country j are given by
(38) EXPk,j = sk(nk − nk−1)yT
k,j
23As we are ultimately interested in bilateral trade costs and as these bilateral trade costs in￿uence
trade ￿ows in both directions, we need to combine (37) and (38) in order to take all available
information on trade ￿ows into account. A useful way of combining unidirectional trade ￿ows
is to multiply them by each other. This yields
(39) EXPj,kEXPk,j = sj(nj − nj−1)yT
j,ksk(nk − nk−1)yT
k,j
In order to derive gravity equation (1) plug the market-clearing condition (18) into the right-
hand side of (37) and use the country-j versions of (28) and (35) and the country-k versions of






















2ρ−1 (nk − nk−1)(Aj (1 − τj,k))ρ−1
Plug the left-hand side of (40) into the right-hand side of (36), noting that Lj = Lk from (27)












Plug the country-j and country-k versions of (41) back into the right-hand side of expression
(37), where the right-hand side uses (18), (28), (30)-(31) and (35), and then rearrange to obtain
(42)
EXPj,k =( 1 − τj,k)
(ρ−1)2




















Finally, note that POPj =( nj−nj−1) and POPk =( nk−nk−1), where POPj is the population
of country j. Also note from (25) that GDPj =( nj − nj−1)yj and
(nj − nj−1)yj = sj(nj − nj−1)yT
j +( 1− sj)(nj − nj−1)yNT
j
and by de￿nition (14)
sj(nj − nj−1)yT
j,j = sj(nj − nj−1)yT
















j,k = GDPj − EXPj
T h es a m ea p p l i e st oGDPk−EXPk. Now plug POPj, POPk, GDPj−EXPj and GDPk−EXPk
into (42) to obtain
(43)
EXPj,k =( 1 − τj,k)
(ρ−1)2

















24The corresponding gravity equation for EXPk,j follows analogously as
(44)
EXPk,j =( 1 − τk,j)
(ρ−1)2

















As in (39), multiply (43) and (44) by each other and impose symmetry τj,k = τk,j to obtain
(1).
A.5 Allowing for Trade Imbalances
Most countries run trade de￿cits or surpluses. These trade imbalances often persist for some
time until rebalancing is required. For example, Australia and Canada ran persistent current
account de￿cits during our period of study. Novy (2007) incorporates trade imbalances into
the model. The derivation is reproduced below. The conclusion is that trade imbalances wash
out when the focus lies on symmetric trade costs such that trade cost measure (2) remains
unaﬀected.
The model is therefore generalized to allow for trade imbalances. The per-capita budget




Tj,l = WjLj + πj
where Tj,l are nominal per-capita transfers from country j to l. As an accounting identity it
follows
(nj − nj−1)Tj,l = −(nl − nl−1)Tl,j
For analytical convenience it is now assumed that per-capita transfers are a fraction of per-
capita consumption spending
Tj,l = µj,lPjCj








PjCj = WjLj + πj
If
PJ
l=1 µj,l > 0,t h e nj is a creditor country and runs a net trade surplus.
The generalized model can now be solved as outlined above. The key equations are given












The markups (21)-(23), per-capita output (27), the real wage (30) and real pro￿ts (32) are not
aﬀected. But if j runs a surplus, this reduces per-capita consumption Cj










Intuitively, due to logarithmic utility in (7), output Lj is constant. But if country j transfers
some of its output to other countries, then its domestic consumption must fall.






where CAj denotes the nominal current account of country j and CONSj denotes its nominal
consumption expenditure.
The equations corresponding to (43) and (44) are
(49)
EXPj,k =( 1 − τj,k)
(ρ−1)2



























EXPk,j =( 1 − τk,j)
(ρ−1)2


























In the case of a balanced current account (CAj = CAk =0 ) equations (49) and (50) simplify
to (43) and (44). If j becomes a surplus country (CAj > 0), this implies an increase in trade
￿ows EXPj,k from j to k and a decrease in trade ￿ows EXPk,j. Multiply (49) and (50) by
each other and impose symmetry τj,k = τk,j to obtain (1), which in turn implies (2). Trade
cost measure (2) therefore also holds in the more general case when countries run trade de￿cits
or surpluses.
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The Sensitivity of Trade Costs to Parameter Assumptions
This appendix shows that our results are not highly sensitive to the assumed elasticity of
substitution and the tradable share. As mentioned, the relative ordering of trade costs is stable
with respect to perturbations in both the elasticities of substitution and the tradable shares.
Our reported regression results, which estimate the elasticity of trade costs with respect to
a change in the observable trade cost proxies, are strongly robust to reasonable shifts in the
parameters.
The following two ￿gures plot the evolution of the log change of trade costs for plausible
ranges of the elasticity of substitution and tradable shares for the United States and the United
Kingdom between 1870 and 1913.
We assume that the elasticity of substitution is 11. But suppose in fact it is an unrealistically
distant 5. For this particular series, the change between 1870 and 1913 is oﬀ by about one-
third. In this case, our headline ￿nding of a 15 percent fall in US trade costs would, in such
a circumstance, have to be revised to yield a 20 percent fall. Such a revision would not alter
our qualitative ￿ndings. The change in trade costs is negatively related to the elasticity of
substitution.
There is, however, a large diﬀerence in the levels. The levels are doubled when moving
from 11 down to 5. If the elasticity of substitution is far from its assumed value, it would not
be prudent to take the exact levels of trade costs at face value. Also we do not explore what
happens when the elasticity moves over time. But as Broda and Weinstein (2006) suggest for
the post-1970 period, this parameter is quite stable.
For unrealistically large perturbations in the tradable share of goods, s, the levels of trade
costs are fairly stable. The ￿gure below shows only slight variation in levels when s moves
from 0.6 to 0.8. There is no change in the ￿rst diﬀerences of trade costs for diﬀerent values of
tradable shares as this parameter enters multiplicatively.
What happens if the tradable share changes over time? If the change is small, then not
much is the answer. However, the assumption of a constant s w o u l dt e n dt oo v e r s t a t ea n y
decline in trade costs in the case of a sizeable (but implausibly large) increase from 0.6 to 0.8.
Conversely, any trade cost declines are understated when s actually falls.
So what is the most plausible path of the fraction of all goods produced that are tradable,
s, in the nineteenth century case? It seems likely that s stayed fairly constant. Tradability is
not the same as whether a good is highly traded. It is also not simply the fraction of measured
GDP devoted to trade. A nontradable good is inherently impossible to trade at any level
of trade costs. A ￿non-traded￿ good refers to the fact that little or no trade in a particular
good will occur when trade costs are prohibitively high. If we see trade in a particular class
of goods increasing over time in the nineteenth century, we believe that the vast majority is
attributable to changes in trade costs rather than to a large increase in the fraction of goods
that can be traded. For example, New Zealand did in fact export some dressed meat to Great
Britain prior to refrigeration. However, this trade increased exponentially in the face of large
reductions in their trade costs. Also, while there must have been some increase in the number
of varieties produced that could be traded, it is equally the case that the period saw the advent
of new economic activity that was inherently nontradable. Government provision of services
and the service sector became increasingly more important in most of these economies. If s fell
somewhat, we may be understating the fall in trade costs but probably by not more than ten
percent, as the second ￿gure in this appendix illustrates.
Finally, consider the non-linearities involved. These create large increases in trade relative
to GDP with seemingly small changes in trade costs. Take US-UK trade in 1900. A doubling
of total trade between the two nations relative to the product of their GDP (minus exports)
would have implied a decrease in trade costs by eight percent, all else being equal. Again, this
percentage is not very sensitive to the elasticity of substitution. To cut iceberg trade costs
f r o mt h ea c t u a l0 . 3 0i n1 9 0 0t o0 . 1 0 ,h o l d i n ge v e r y t h i n ge l s ec o n s t a n t ,w o u l dh a v er e q u i r e d
both countries￿ export to GDP ratios to rise from roughly two percent to 25 percent. Such
calculations also highlight that a doubling of the export to GDP ratio (a standard measure of
integration) is compatible with much less than a halving of trade costs.











































































































Bilateral trade: Taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom (various
years), Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years), and Tableau GØnØral du Com-
merce de la France avec ses Colonies et les Puissances EtrangŁres (various years). Trade was
c o n v e r t e di n t or e a l1 9 9 0U Sd o l l a r su s i n gt h eU SC P Id e ￿ator in Oﬃcer and Williamson (2007).
GDP: Taken from Maddison (1995).
Population: Taken from Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c).
Tariﬀs: Measured as total customs revenue divided by imports taken from Mitchell (2003a,
2003b, 2003c). Many observations come from data kindly provided to us by Michael Clemens
and Jeﬀrey Williamson and are based on Clemens and Williamson (2004). Belgium is from
DegrŁve (1982). Switzerland is from Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer (1996).
Gold standard adherence: Based on data underlying Meissner (2005) and equals one
when both countries adhere to the gold standard.
Exchange rate volatility:D e ￿ned as the standard deviation of the monthly diﬀerence of
logged nominal exchange rates in a given year. Taken from the Global Financial Database.
Distance: Measured as kilometers between capital cities. Taken from indo.com
Railroads and land area: Taken from Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c).
British Empire: Based on authors￿ recollection and equals one if both countries were
members of the British Empire.
29References
Aldcroft, Derek H., The development of British industry and foreign competition,
1875-1914: Studies in industrial enterprise, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968.
Anderson, James E., ￿A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation,￿ American
Economic Review, 1979, 69 (1), 106￿116.
and Eric van Wincoop, ￿Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle,￿
American Economic Review, March 2003, 93 (1), 170￿192.
and , ￿Trade Costs,￿ Journal of Economic Literature, September 2004, 42, 691￿751.
Baier, Scott L. and Jeﬀrey H. Bergstrand, ￿The Growth of World Trade: Tariﬀs,
Transport Costs, and Income Similarity,￿ Journal of International Economics, 2001, 53,
1￿27.
Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom, London: HMSO, various years.
B r o d a ,C h r i s t i a nM .a n dD a v i dE .W e i n s t e i n , ￿Globalization and the Gains from
Variety,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006, 121, 541￿585.
Clemens, Michael and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson, ￿Wealth Bias in the First Global Capital
Market Boom,￿ Economic Journal, April 2004, 114, 304￿337.
DegrŁve, Daniel, Le Commerce ExtØrieur de la Belgique, 1830-1913-1939, PrØsentation
Critique des DonnØes Statistiques 1982.
Direction gØnØrale des douanes, Tableau gØnØral du commerce de la France avec ses
colonies et les puissances ØtrangŁres, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, various years.
Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum, ￿Technology, Geography and Trade,￿
Econometrica, 2002, 70 (5), 1741￿1779.
Estevadeordal, Antoni, Brian Frantz, and Alan M. Taylor,￿ T h eR i s ea n dF a l lo f
World Trade, 1870-1939,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, 118, 359￿407.
Evenett, Simon J. and Wolfgang Keller, ￿On Theories Explaining the Success of the
Gravity Equation,￿ Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 110 (2), 281￿316.
Federico, Giovanni and Karl Gunnar Persson, ￿Market Integration and Convergence in
the World Wheat Market, 1800-2000,￿ in Kevin H. O￿Rourke Tim Hatton and Alan M.
Taylor, eds., The New Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeﬀrey G.
Williamson, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007, pp. 87￿114.
Flandreau, Marc and Mathilde Maurel, ￿Monetary Union, Trade Integration and
Business Fluctuations in 19th Century Europe: Just Do It,￿ Working Paper 3087, CEPR
November 2001.
Frieden, Jeﬀry A., Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century,N e w
York: W.W. Norton, 2006.
Harley, C. Knick, ￿Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740-1913,￿ Journal of Economic
History, 1988, 48, 851￿876.
Irwin, Douglas A., ￿Explaining America￿s Surge in Manufactured Exports, 1880-1913,￿
Review of Economics and Statistics, May 2003, 82 (2), 364￿376.
Jacks, David S., ￿Intra- and International Commodity Market Integration in the Atlantic
Economy, 1800-1913,￿ Explorations in Economic History, 2005, 42.
, ￿What Drove Nineteenth Century Commodity Market Integration?,￿ Explorations in
Economic History, 2006, 42 (3), 383￿412.
James, Harold, The End of Globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Krugman, Paul, ￿Scale Economies, Product Diﬀerentiation and the Pattern of Trade,￿
American Economic review, 1980, 70, 950￿959.
L￿pez-C￿rdova, J. Ernesto and Christopher M. Meissner, ￿Exchange Rate Regimes
and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era,￿ American
Economic Review, 2003, 93 (1), 344￿353.
Maddison, Angus, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, Paris: Development Centre,
OECD, 1995.
Meissner, Christopher M., ￿A New World Order: Explaining the International Diﬀusion of
the Gold Standard, 1870-1913,￿ Journal of International Economics, 2005, 66 (2), 385￿406.
Mitchell, Brian R., International Historical Statistics. Africa, Asia & Oceania 1750-1988,
New York: Stockton Press, 2003a.
, International Historical Statistics. Europe 1750-1988, New York: Stockton Press, 2003b.
, International Historical Statistics. The Americas 1750-1988, New York: Stockton Press,
302003c.
Mitchener, Kris J. and Marc Weidenmier, ￿Trade and Empire,￿ 2007. Mimeo, Santa
Clara University.
Novy, Dennis, ￿Is the Iceberg Melting Less Quickly? International Trade Costs After World
War II,￿ Mimeo. University of Warwick, 2007.
Obstfeld, Maurice and Alan M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and
Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
and Kenneth Rogoﬀ, ￿Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux,￿ Journal of Political Economy,
1995, 103, 624￿606.
and , ￿The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common
Cause?,￿ in Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoﬀ,e d s . ,NBER Macroeconomics Annual,
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.
Oﬃcer, Lawrence H. and Samuel H. Williamson, Purchasing Power of Money in the
United States from 1774 to 2006, 2007. Downloaded from http://MeasuringWorth.com.
O￿Rourke, Kevin H. and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson, ￿Late Nineteenth-Century
Anglo-American Factor-Price Convergence: Were Heckscher and Ohlin Right?,￿ Journal of
Economic History, December 1994, 54 (4), 892￿916.
and , Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic
Economy, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 1999.
and Ronald Findlay, ￿Commodity Market Integration, 1500-2000,￿ in Alan M. Taylor
M i c h a e lD .B o r d oa n dJ e ﬀrey G. Williamson, eds., Globalization in Historical Perspective,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003, chapter 1, pp. 13￿62.
Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer, H., S t a t i s t i q u eH i s t o r i q u ed el aS u i s s e , Zurich: Chronos, 1996.
Samuelson, Paul, ￿The Transfer Problem and Transport Costs: Analysis of Eﬀects of Trade
Impediments,￿ Economic Journal, 1954, 64, 264￿289.
Saul, S.B., Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870-1914, Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press, 1967.
Sessional Papers, Trade of the British Empire and foreign competition: despatch from Mr
Chamberlain to the Governors of the Colonies and the High Commissioner of Cyprus and
the replies thereto,V o l .l xo fParliamentary Papers, HMSO, 1897.
Shah Mohammed, S. I. and Williamson, Jeﬀrey G., ￿Freight Rates and Productivity
Gains in British Tramp Shipping, 1869-1950,￿ Explorations in Economic History, 2004, 41,
172￿203.
Stockman, Alan C. and Linda Tesar, ￿Tastes and Technology in a Two-Country Model
of the Business Cycle: Explaining International Comovements,￿ American Economic
Review, 1995, 85 (1), 168￿185.
United States Department of Commerce, Statistical abstract of the United States: The
National Data Book, Washington: US Government Printing Oﬃce, various years.
Whalley, John and Xian Xin, ￿Regionalization, Changes in Home Bias, and the Growth
of World Trade,￿ Working Paper 13023, National Bureau of Economic Research April 2007.
Williamson, Jeﬀrey G., ￿Explaining World Tariﬀs, 1870-1913: Stolper-Samuelson,
Strategic Tariﬀs, and State Revenues,￿ in H. Lindgren R. Findlay, H. Henriksson and
M. Lundhal, eds., Eli Heckscher, International Trade, and Economic History, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2006, pp. 199￿228.
31Table 1: Summary Statistics of Data
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade costs Log of bilateral trade costs 2097 -0.9449 0.2143 -1.4697 -0.4155
Distance Log of great-circle distance in kilometers 2097 8.1150 1.2586 5.5835 9.8509
Tariffs Log of the product of tariff revenues over import values 2097 -4.6885 1.3046 -8.5980 -0.4391
ER volatility Standard deviation of the change in logged nominal exchange rates 2097 0.0077 0.0118 0.0000 0.1226
Gold standard Gold standard indicator equal to one if both countries adhere 2097 0.6018 0.4896 0.0000 1.0000
British Empire British Empire indicator equal to one if both countries are members 2097 0.0615 0.2403 0.0000 1.0000
Railroads Log of the product of railroad length over area 2097 -7.1549 2.0385 -14.6003 -3.8911
Table 2: The Determinants of Trade Costs, 1870-1913
Coefficient Std Error p-value Coefficient Std. Error p-value
Distance 0.0676 0.0170 0.00  ---  ---  ---
Tariffs 0.0215 0.0028 0.00 0.0219 0.0029 0.00
ER volatility 0.0851 0.1066 0.43 0.0945 0.1066 0.38
Gold standard -0.0365 0.0034 0.00 -0.0365 0.0034 0.00
British Empire -0.5006 0.0874 0.00  ---  ---  ---
Railroads -0.0143 0.0019 0.00 -0.0144 0.0019 0.00
N: 2097 2097
R-squared: 0.5354 0.2126
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is the log of trade costs; time fixed effects not reported.
See Table 1 for variable descriptions.
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-pair level.
Column 2: Country-pair fixed effects Column 1: Random effects
32Table 3: Accounting for Changes in Trade by Region, 1870-1913
Growth of  Contribution of  Contribution of 
international trade output growth trade cost decline
Full sample with all countries 392.10%
N=48 100 55.7 44.3
with the Americas 296.10%
N=8 100 79.5 20.5
with Asia 572.30%
N=6 100 35.3 64.7
with Europe 342.10%
N=30 100 58.1 41.9
with Oceania 545.00%
N=6 100 44.3 55.7
France with all countries 350.10%
N=17 100 57.3 42.7
with the Americas 255.30%
N=3 100 80.4 19.6
with Asia 484.70%
N=2 100 34.7 65.3
with Europe 275.00%
N=10 100 60.6 39.4
with Oceania 732.60%
N=2 100 28.8 71.2
UK with all countries 277.30%
N=17 100 64.1 35.9
with the Americas 244.80%
N=3 100 87.7 12.3
with Asia 581.90%
N=2 100 28.3 71.7
with Europe 211.40%
N=10 100 63.8 36.2
with Oceania 351.60%
N=2 100 66.4 33.6
US with all countries 520.80%
N=17 100 50.9 49.1
with the Americas 434.30%
N=2 100 65.7 34.3
with Asia 650.30%
N=2 100 42.8 57.2
with Europe 507.50%
N=11 100 52.1 47.9
with Oceania 550.90%
N=2 100 37.8 62.2
Notes: All values in percent
18 countries in total
   11 in Europe (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK)
   3 in America (Brazil, Canada, US)
   2 in Asia (Dutch East Indies, Japan)
   2 in Oceania (Australia, New Zealand)
Balanced sample of trade costs (US, UK, France with 17 partners each)
Total observations: 48=3*17-3 (eliminating 3 double observations due to symmetry, e.g. US-UK=UK-US)








































Figure 4: Index of Average Trade Costs, France, UK, US, 1870-1913
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